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Abstract
Background: A child is a developing person with evolving capacities that include autonomy, mental (decisional)
capacity and capacity to assume responsibility. Hence, children are entitled to participatory (autonomy) rights in
South Africa as observed in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. According to section 129 of the Act a child may consent
to his or her own medical treatment provided that he or she is over the age of 12 years and is of sufficient
maturity and decisional capacity to understand the various implications of the treatment including the risks and
benefits thereof. However, the Act does not provide a definition for what qualifies as ‘sufficient maturity’ nor does it
stipulate how health professionals ought to assess the decisional capacity of a child. In addition, South Africa is a
culturally diverse country. The Western liberal notion of autonomy may not necessarily find equal prominence in
the mores of people with a different worldview. Hence we demonstrate a few salient comparisons between legal
liberal moral theory and African communitarianism as pertinent to the autonomy of the child.
Discussion: Children are rights-holders by virtue of their humanity. Their dignity as individual human persons
affords them the entitlement to human rights as contemplated under the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa. However, contrary to the traditional Western notion of individual autonomous persons African societies hold
a communalistic notion of person hence there is less regard for individual autonomy and rights with more
emphasis on the communal good and maintaining the continuity of relationships and interdependencies shared
within a community. A child considered in this view is not regarded as a full person. This implies that decisions
concerning the child, including consent to medical treatment are discussed and determined by the community to
which the child belongs. Lastly, in this article, we draw on the notion of capacity for responsibility to produce a
pragmatic definition of sufficient maturity.
Conclusion: It seems reasonable to suggest a move away from a general legal age of consent for medical
treatment toward more individualised, context-specific approaches in determining the maturity of a child patient to
consent to medical treatment. Perhaps, decision-making with respect to consent to the medical treatment of a
child belonging to a traditional African community where the notion of a person is embedded in
communitarianism ought to involve the child’s parents/guardians/caregivers where possible provided that the best
interests of the child are awarded priority.
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Background
The concept of the autonomy of a child in the context
of healthcare is both complex and challenging globally.
In South Africa the controversy surrounding children
and autonomy has come into sharp focus since the
promulgation of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (herein-
after referred to as “the Children’s Act” or “the Act”).
Much of the debate revolves around the concept of ma-
turity and the child’s developing capacity to consent.
The process of development generally concerns pro-
gressive advances from one state, usually primitive or
simple, toward another, usually more complex or ad-
vanced. Where this process typically terminates is what
is colloquially (and formally) understood as maturity.
There are various dimensions of maturity including
emotional, biological, cognitive and social. However, for
the sake of firmer pertinence to our research question
we concern ourselves herein with cognitive and social
maturity as they bear directly on Western liberalism and
African communitarianism, the former often emphasis-
ing rationality and individualism and the latter; sociality
of persons albeit not refuting the significance of other
dimensions of maturity such as the emotionality of the
deciding subject in decision-making. We can thus con-
ceive of a child as a developing person with evolving cap-
acities like autonomy, mental (decisional) capacity and
capacity to assume responsibility. Notwithstanding pos-
session of capacities, we must first plainly conceive of a
child as a person; a human being. Although this plain
conception of a child is indeed attractive as it admits no
prejudice toward children as rights-holders, a fuller and
more adequate definition is required to define when a
subject becomes a person1 and at what age we should
consider a person no longer to be regarded as a child
but rather an adult [1].
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
(hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”) aligns itself
with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child (ACRWC) and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) [2, 3] with regard
to exalting children as independent legal actors – as
stipulated in the Act2, and in defining which persons are
entitled to provisions entailed therein. It provides that a
child is a person under the age of 18 years3 [2, 4]. It also
follows that a person is considered to have attained ma-
jority at this age. Furthermore, under the Children’s Act,
a child is considered a rights-holder, not merely a prop-
erty or extension of her parents or an object of adult
concern [2, 5]. Children are indeed persons with an
evolving capacity for individual autonomy [6] hence de-
serve the right to express their views freely in matters af-
fecting them4. The relevant sections in the Children’s
Act attend to the various jurisdictions of a child but of
particular interest to us is section 129 of the Children’s
Act which pertains to the consent of children to medical
treatment. Section 129 expressly dictates the prerequi-
sites for the medical treatment of a child and stipulates
as follows:
‘(2) A child may consent to his or her own medical treat-
ment or to the medical treatment of his or her child if-
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and
(b)the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental
capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and
other implications of the treatment.’ [4]
In the past, when the Child Care Act 75 of 1983 was
still in effect, only children above the age of 14 years
could consent to medical treatment [7]. What necessi-
tated law reform was a realisation of a number of short-
comings experienced with the Child Care Act5 and a
need to fully acknowledge children as rights-holders. A
lower threshold for age of consent was thus seen as a
means to promote access to health services, promote
participation of children in health decisions affecting
them in accordance with international trends [7, 8].
Over the years there has been mounting empirical evi-
dence suggesting lowering age thresholds for decisional
capacity in children. For example it has been demon-
strated that children below 12 years can make well con-
sidered decisions [9] and that children as young as nine
years old can understand issues pertinent to decision
making in clinical trials [10] however the statutory age
of consent to medical treatment as stipulated in various
countries appears arbitrary as it varies from 12 to
19 years [11].
A child contemplated under the Children’s Act must
satisfy two requirements before accessing medical treat-
ment on his or her own, that is, without parental, guard-
ian, or care-giver’s consent being required. The first
requirement is that the child must have reached 12 years
of age to consent. The second requirement is that the
child must have ‘sufficient maturity’ and decisional cap-
acity to understand the ‘benefits, risks, social and other
implications of the treatment.’6 [12] However, there are
a few deficiencies in this section of the Act with regard
to definitions, regulations and sufficient descriptions [8].
Firstly, the Act does not provide a definition regarding
what ought to be considered medical treatment. Hence,
for the purposes of this article, we define medical treat-
ment as a non-invasive intervention usually in the form
of a drug7. Secondly, the Act also does not provide a def-
inition of sufficient maturity. Hence, we will compre-
hend that the Act infers by ‘sufficient maturity’ a degree
of cognitive development that affords a child the kind of
engagement necessary in decision-making comparable to
that of fully developed persons, namely, adults8. We will
provide an alternative rendition of ‘sufficient maturity’ in
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the course of this article. Thirdly, there is no provision
in the Act specifying how the health practitioner ought
to assess a child’s decisional capacity. This is com-
pounded by the fact that there currently is no standard
objective tool for assessing the decisional capacity of
children [9].
Moreover, considering that South Africa is a cultur-
ally diverse country [5] another concern with regard
to the implementation of the Act involves the poten-
tial consequence of conferring (autonomy) rights on
children without commensurate responsibilities to
their community9. For ‘[i]n the African context, for
example, individual autonomy is of smaller status
than the pursuit of the communal good’10 [5]. In view
of this, it appears the conferring of autonomy rights
on children without cementing their reciprocal duties
erodes interdependent relations between the child and
his or her community [13, 14].
Our research question may be posited as follows: given
the newest developments in child law as regards the
conception of the child and his or her participation in
society, how may appeals to different moral theories
(African communitarianism and Western liberalism) aid
in finding better and alternative means of determining
how and by whom decisions about medical treatment of
the child should be made? Perhaps there has not been a
time better suited to address questions of this nature
than today given the near-universal advocacy for chil-
dren’s rights and the resurgence of activism and schol-
arly criticism against old hegemonic conceptions such as
the status of children in civil society, person and person-
hood and so forth.
In advancing forth our argument we first assert children
as rights-holders, give an overview of the doctrine of in-
formed consent and the principle of respect for individual
autonomy and the legal conception of a person in the set-
ting of the Constitution; discuss African communitarian-
ism with regard to its notion of a person and personhood
and the child and the implications thereof in the consent
of children to medical treatment. And in pursuit of a case-
specific definition for sufficient maturity we appeal to the
notion of capacity for responsibility. Lastly, in view of both
legal liberal and African communitarian moral vantages
we conclude by giving due attention to the enquiry
whether a 12 year old is of sufficient maturity to consent
to medical treatment with the conviction that no moral
theory should be assigned an absolute (moral) value a
priori, that is, antecedent to the context within which it is
to be observed and/or contemplated.
Discussion
Asserting children as rights-holders
As a point of departure, a child is a developing person.
When he or she obtains decisional capacity of such
degree that affords him or her the kind of engagement
necessary in decision-making comparable to that of fully
developed persons, viz. adults, we will comprehend that
as what is inferred by the Act as ‘sufficient maturity’. It
appears to follow from this that a child with sufficient
maturity ought to be equally afforded autonomy rights
in decision-making, including medical treatment as is
the case in adults. For ‘[c]onferring rights on children is
viewed as ‘recognising their moral equality with adults,
thereby underscoring the moral worth of all human be-
ings, irrespective of their situation.’ (emphasis added)
[12], and by autonomy rights we understand broadly
those entitlements persons have which allow them the
freedom of involvement in matters affecting them as
members of civil society, be they public or private (also
referred to herein as participatory rights); different per-
haps to rights in general which are often conceived as
entitlements persons have plainly by virtue of being per-
sons . Having said that, do these rights also extend to
those children who do not possess sufficient maturity
and/or decisional capacity? The Act is unambiguous on
this issue. Where a child is judged to lack sufficient ma-
turity and decisional capacity to understand the benefits,
risks, social and other implications of the treatment the
authorisation of his or her consent devolves on the par-
ent, guardian or caregiver. However, this question high-
lights a central problem in many rights theories as to
what we mean by the notion of rights and who qualifies
to be a rights-holder [15]? For if the conferring of par-
ticipatory rights is contingent on possession of certain
dispositions or traits such as capacity, degree of maturity,
age, condition of dependency and so on as some commen-
tators might argue then holding such rights indeed be-
comes exclusionary and further, fails dismally in serving
the very groups it was purposed to protect [12, 15]. Hence,
we maintain: if we are to truly recognise the moral equal-
ity of children with adults we ought to grant that capacity
of whatever kind need not be the arbitrating principle on
the conferring of rights on children.
Admissibly, as Mosikatsana observes, ‘[t]he difficulty
with granting children rights is that their physical, emo-
tional, and intellectual immaturity cause dependence on
adults to assist children in exercising those rights’ [13],
but, as O Neill writes (as cited by Mosikatsana) the fact
that children ‘cannot claim their rights for themselves…
is no reason for denying them rights. Rather it is reason
for setting up institutions that can monitor those who
have children in their charge and intervene to enforce
rights.’ [13] Therefore, as convenient a notion as suffi-
cient maturity and decisional capacity may appear, they
do confine our discourse on the rights of the child to
the exclusion of others and their claims.
Moreover, children have moral status (or moral worth)
plainly by virtue of being humans or persons (these
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terms are used interchangeably in this paper). It would
indeed appear morally unsound, let alone ‘morally mon-
strous’ [16], for one to argue that children have lower
moral status compared to adults as it also appears un-
likely that one can indeed justify it with sound moral
reasoning. It is rather best assuming a value theory that
does not in any manner legitimise preferences to the ac-
quisition of certain capacities in the development of per-
sons [17] in order for us to arrive upon the conclusion
of equal rights and moral status of all persons plainly by
virtue of their humanity. And by humanity we broadly
refer to the totality of universal potentialities, qualities
and dispositions which both constitute and distinguish
us as persons, whatever these may entail. Here the con-
ferring of rights is then premised solely on the notion of
humanity and not on some other contingent condition.
(This argument equally applies to the entities enumer-
ated in the following developmental continuum: ‘blasto-
cyst, zygote, embryo, foetus, neonate, baby, infant, child,
minor, adolescent, adult’ [16].) This attribution of rights
founded plainly on the notion of humanity is also appar-
ent in the preamble of the UNCRC which recognises the
‘inherent dignity and…equal… rights of all members of
the human family’ [12, 18]. It follows from this that chil-
dren are indeed rights-holders for the same reasons we
recognise in adults (that is, their humanity) and thus
should be afforded equal rights as adults including par-
ticipatory rights.
However, to exercise participatory rights requires au-
tonomy – a capacity that is acquired over time through
the process of development. It is obvious that certain
age-groups will lack this capacity and thus may not have
the commensurate wherewithal to exercise participatory
rights in decision making [19]. Although there seems lit-
tle contention to assert this, it need not necessarily fol-
low that persons judged deficient of such capacity be
stripped of that right completely as the argument herein
advanced is that the affordment of participatory rights
should not be predicated on the basis of capacity to ex-
ercise a right but rather on the existence of fundamental
human interests that deserve protection from prejudicial
forces.
In contending the notion of capacity in the setting of
the “rights talk” Federle writes:
Children clearly have been disadvantaged by a rights
theory premised upon capacity. The incapacities of
children and their concomitant need to be protected
from themselves and others permit the state to
restrict the activities of children in ways that would be
impermissible in the case of adults. Furthermore,
these incompetencies suggest that the rights children
do have are somehow different, less fundamental, and
more easily overridden by paternalistic concerns for
the safety and well-being of children. Consequently,
the courts have authorized significant restrictions on
the liberty interests of children as legitimate protective
measures. Nevertheless, our laws may subject children
to selective and discriminatory laws with concomi-
tantly greater restrictions on their liberty than would
be sanctioned in the case of adults. [15]
It is for these reasons that we argue that children are
rights-holders regardless of whether or not they possess
the wherewithal to exercise these rights.
The doctrine of informed consent
The doctrine of informed consent holds that persons are
their own sovereign and should thus be allowed to make
the final decision on affairs concerning them providing
that the elements required for informed consent (or in-
formed refusal) [20] have been satisfied. These elements
include:
1. Competence;
2. Disclosure of information;
3. Understanding and appreciation of information
disclosed;
4. Voluntariness in decision-making;
5. Ability to express a choice [5].
In view of the above it may safely be declared that in-
formed consent has occurred when a competent person
has received a thorough disclosure, understands and ap-
preciates the disclosure, acts voluntarily, and consents to
the intervention [19]. We briefly elaborate on these in
the following accounts.
Competence11 simply refers to the ability to per-
form a task [20]. It is task and context-specific and
changes over time. By convention, age and decisional
capacity are thought to be the chief elements that
constitute competence. Albeit several competence as-
sessment tools for children have been devised by various
authors e.g. Hopkin’s Competency Test, Competency
Questionnaire-Child Psychiatric and the Competency
Questionnaire-Pediatric Outpatient Modified Version,
there currently exists no standard objective tool to as-
sess a child’s competence to consent to medical treat-
ment [9, 10]. This inclines assessors of competence
(health practitioners) to make judgements based on
subjective assessments. A patient’s competence is in-
fluenced by their experience with a medical condition,
hospitalisation, family relationships and social roles
and development [21].
Furthermore, ‘[i]t is a legal obligation for health practi-
tioners to disclose relevant information to their patients
regarding:
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1) The patient’s health condition (except when
disclosure of information would be contrary to the
patient’s best interest)
2) Available diagnostic and treatment options
3) Risks, benefits, costs and consequences attached
with each option
4) The option of non-treatment, that is, informed refusal
and its implications.’ [5]
The patient should also attach significance to the in-
formation disclosed.
‘The process of consent should also be conducted in a
language that the patient understands and in a manner
that considers the patient’s level of literacy. This is espe-
cially so with children.’ [5].
In addition, for informed consent to be valid it must
be voluntary, that is, the patient must not be influenced
by other individuals either by coercion, persuasion or
manipulation [5, 19].
Lastly the patient’s choice to treatment or non-
treatment may be expressed orally, in writing or may be
implied, that is, tacit consent [19, 22].
Capacity for responsibility
A deciding subject, in this instance a child, ought not
to only consider given choices but also accept the
prospective responsibilities involved. And to ‘accept
responsibility means to be able to be held accountable
for whatever decisions are taken, on the basis of the
assumption that reasons can be provided, that they
have been thought through, and even though they
might be fallible.’ [23]. That is, a deciding child must
also have the capacity for responsibility for that par-
ticular choice decided upon, whatever this may entail.
Capacity for responsibility therefore refers to a decid-
ing subject’s ability to deal with the likely outcomes
of his or her decision.
Whilst we grant that a person need not possess cap-
acity of any kind to have moral status and constitutional
rights (human dignity, privacy, freedom), as we estab-
lished above, we argue that a deciding subject must then
necessarily possess or be facilitated insofar as it is prac-
tically possible to possess the commensurate where-
withal for responsibility to account for that particular
choice decided upon. In view of this, we arrive at our
ultimate definition of ‘sufficient maturity’:
A child has sufficient maturity to consent to medical
treatment insofar as he or she can independently
demonstrate (or be facilitated either by aids or a
helper as far as it is practically possible in that given
setting to possess) the commensurate wherewithal
required to assume responsibility for that specific
decision.
To clarify this definition, let us make an example: a
child patient is newly diagnosed with type I diabetes
mellitus and it is required that she consents to using in-
sulin injections as her treatment. To determine whether
she has sufficient maturity to consent to using insulin
injections the health practitioner must consider, among
other factors, whether the child would be able to take
the chronic medication as frequently as prescribed. A
child who has previous experience with a chronic illness
like asthma may be presumed to already possess the cap-
acity to assume the responsibility of taking chronic
medication. Those children whom it is believed cannot
demonstrate the forgoing capacity in order to assume re-
sponsibility can be facilitated to attain this capacity. In
the case where a child patient refuses treatment we ad-
vise that recourse be made to the best interest principle.
A child (or adult) who fails this definition of sufficient
maturity may be considered incompetent to make a
decision.
The Constitution on autonomy and the legal conception
of a person
Human dignity is expressly enumerated in the Bill of
Rights Chapter of the Constitution as a human right that
deserves respect and protection. It is a foundational
value that ‘informs the interpretation of other specific
rights’ [24]. Albeit some authors, such as Jordaan [24],
claim that one of the fundamental elements of human
dignity include the capacity for autonomy whether
understood as free-will or rational deliberation [25], we
maintain throughout this paper that human dignity in
general denotes a universal, and objective value inherent
to all human persons notwithstanding capacity.
The notion of autonomy is derived from the Greek
expressions: ‘autos’ – self, and ‘nomos’ – law, referring
to a self-legislating agent [19, 24, 25]. Autonomy is a
constitutional value defined by the Courts as ‘the abil-
ity to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own
detriment’ [24]. Implicit in this juridical definition is
the acknowledgement of autonomy as a developmen-
tal phenomenon. This is inferred by the term “ability”
implying that autonomy is an evolving capacity that
is, acquired in the process of human development.
According to the provisions of the UNCRC and the
ACWRC, a child has autonomy rights. The Children’s
Act first defines a child as a person below the age of
18 years and further specifies in section 129 which
children can fully exercise autonomy rights in the set-
ting of consent to medical treatment (as dealt with
above) [4] It is plain from the forgoing definition of a
child that rights are ascribable only to persons not
things12. According to Black’s Law dictionary a nat-
ural person considered in juridical contexts is a hu-
man being; a legal entity with rights and duties that
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deserve protection and respect [26]. However, it still
remains unclear as to what is truly meant by the no-
tion of person or human being; what potentialities,
qualities and dispositions declare us as persons and
thereby entitle us to constitutional rights (e.g. auton-
omy rights), and duties in general. We acknowledge
the import of such a definition as a desideratum not
only in juridical but also in philosophico-ethical con-
texts with regard to moral status and abortion.
African communitarianism on autonomy, the conception
of a person and the consent of a child to medical
treatment
‘Amidst gathering talk of human rights and civil
society, of the celebration of autochthony and
authenticity, the version of an African Renaissance
arises to counter the rampant excesses of European
modes of being-in-the world’ [27]
Communitarianism is a moral theory concerned
with the pursuit of the communal good. It expressly
repudiates individual autonomy (and liberal moral
theory) and exalts community. In this theory, individ-
ual rights become docile whilst duties owed by a
member to his or her community are held to be of
great import, and communal values such as mutual
reciprocity, collective loyalties and solidarity are en-
dorsed [19, 28]. The consideration of a person has al-
ways been at the centre of consternation in this
moral theory. The problem can be stated as follows:
is a person wholly embedded in a communal matrix
of interrelations and interdependencies without the
concession of individual autonomy as radical commu-
nitarians insist or does one retain his or her individ-
ual merits like autonomy within a community as
moderate communitarians argue?13 [19, 28].
African societies generally uphold communal values
(African communitarianism), of those, the highest
weight is assigned to relationships shared within a com-
munity [19, 28, 29], and to human life (vitality). Thus, a
person has the duty to preserve the continuity of such
relationships by pursuing the communal good, whatever
this may entail. In traditional African thought a person
exists as an extended entity embedded within a commu-
nal matrix of interrelations and interdependencies,
owing much to the relational nature of human beings.
Thus, a person is regarded as an ontological and epis-
temological reference thereof [28, 29]. This concept of a
person is no better expressed than in John Mbiti’s coin-
age of the African ethos:
‘I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I
am’ [30]
Personhood in the African ethos is thought to be ac-
quired through a process of incorporation into the com-
munity [29] and this involves executing one’s duties
owed to the community. And we may add here that this
requires a good measure of social maturity. Personhood
in this view is something that one can indeed fail. More-
over, in this view a child is not considered as a person as
it is yet to fulfil its duties to attain personhood [29]. This
however raises an important question: How can we ac-
knowledge the rights of children (as we asserted else-
where) if we cannot conceive of them as full persons?
To answer this we appeal to an alternative interpretation
of the notion of human dignity established upon the
African communitarian value for vitality [25] as opposed
to autonomy and declare this as follows: a child (or be-
ing) has human dignity thereby human rights insofar as
he or she has vitality14.
In truth, however, African communitarianism15 is
premised upon a duty-based system; not naturally
perceived nor experienced as being oppressive to the
individual since the individual himself or herself rea-
lises his or her interests as being consonant with the
pursuit of the communal good and sees nothing else
outside this [31]. He or she therefore finds little sense
in “going on” about individual rights that seemingly
conflict with the harmony of interrelations and inter-
dependencies shared within the very community
whence he or she derives self-worth and security with
regard to individual welfare.
In healthcare where informed consent is a necessary
ethical and legal requirement to solicit from a patient
before performing an indicated medical intervention a
patient from an African communitarian society may
often wish to consult with his or her community to
make a decision [32, 33]. This derives from the fact that
in African communitarian societies the best interests of
all persons, not only the child, are determined by the
community based on the communal value-system.
Hence important decisions are arrived upon through
collective discussions, often in the presence of elders
from the community since their wisdom is highly
regarded concerning (moral) decision-making to guard
the interest of the community. Where consent to the
medical treatment of a child (or person) is concerned it
is likely that the community from which the child be-
longs will collectively decide on this. It appears therefore
that the African value system is indeed in conflict with
the law which permits a child 12 years or older to make
an autonomous decision regarding his/her medical
treatment.
Conclusion
It seems reasonable to suggest that we move away from
a general age of consent toward more individualised,
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context-specific approaches in determining the maturity
of a child patient to consent to medical treatment.
Conferring rights upon children based on capacity
(autonomy rights and decisional capacity in this in-
stance) alone may be myopic at best. Hence, we sub-
scribe to the minimal notion that where a child is
able to express his or her will based on an established
value system and rationality they ought to have their
views taken seriously in decisions pertaining to their
medical treatment. We also suggested an alternative
definition of sufficient maturity which can be used to
determine whether a child patient is indeed compe-
tent to consent to medical treatment or not without
unfairly discriminating against children based on their
perceived incapacities. The proposed definition places
emphasis on the prospective duties that the decision-
maker ought to be able to execute consequent to his
or her decision.
In South Africa conflict exists between law and the
African value system. In view of both legal liberal
and African communitarian moral theories it is how-
ever plain that no one theory can account for how
we ought to conceive of a child and his or her free-
dom to consent to medical treatment antecedent to
the context within which the child is raised. Hence,
we argue that no moral theory should be assigned
an absolute (moral) value a priori, that is, ante-
cedent to the context within which it is to be ob-
served and/or contemplated and propose that in the
case of a child who belongs to an African communi-
tarian society decision-making with respect to con-
sent to her medical treatment ought to involve the
child’s community (included here are the child’s par-
ents/guardians/caregivers) insofar as it is possible
provided that the best interests of the child are
awarded priority.
Endnotes
1Alternatively, when does personhood or childhood
begin?
2The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 is the most significant
statute in South Africa entailing provisions and protec-
tions of the constitutional rights of the child. Among
these rights are those pertaining to the participation of
children in health treatment decisions.
3See Article 2 of the ACRWC and Article 1 of the
UNCRC. South Africa ratified the ACRWC in 2000 and
the UNCRC in 1995.
4See section 10 of the Children’s Act.
5Some of these shortcomings included difficulties find-
ing the caregivers or foster parents of orphans or child-
headed households when required to consent to medical
treatment thereby access health services.
6This requirement derives from the Gillick v West
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority case and
is commonly referred to as the “Gillick competence
test” [8].
7However, we also maintain that regardless of
whether an intervention is indeed medical or not
recourse should always be made to the principle of
respect for human dignity as enshrined in the
Constitution.
8It still remains to be proven whether such degree of
maturity can indeed be clearly defined, measured and
objectively validated with the support of empirical
evidence.
9The term “community” will be used broadly to also
denote family as a communal unit.
10The communal good involves preserving the continu-
ity of communal interrelations and interdependencies.
11In this article we use the terms competence and cap-
acity interchangeably.
12A calabash for example cannot conceivably have
rights (or duties) insofar as any rational person cannot
conceive of it a person, or rather, insofar as it is not a
person notwithstanding its aesthetic, economic and so-
cial value.
13For the sake of brevity we will not engage this en-
quiry any further, saving it for another occasion.
14Vitality may be thought as a being’s ability (or po-
tentiality thereof ) to ‘exhibit a superlative degree of
health, strength, growth, reproduction, creativity, vi-
brancy, activity, self-motion, courage and confidence,
with a lack of life force being constituted by the pres-
ence of disease, weakness, decay, barrenness, destruc-
tion, lethargy, passivity, submission, insecurity and
depression’ [25].
15The terms “African communitarianism”, “African
context” and “traditional African thought” are
employed in the general sense where that which we
denote as “African” refers to whatever it is that re-
lates to the continent’s indigenous cultures, people
and heritage. Often it is asked how can one speak
broadly of an African context, thought or ethos and
so given the diversity within the continent. To answer
this question let us imagine for instance there being
culture p (p being one of the indigenous cultures of
Africa). Although culture p may not be a microcosm
of the African’s mode of being in the world, it may
be said that it shares certain commonalities with
other indigenous cultures mutatis mutandis to permit
reference to our observations in p as “African”, espe-
cially if one considers African cultures forming inter-
secting lines or partly overlapping circles; where they
intersect or overlap we may speak of specific (ethno-
cultural) universals which one may broadly denote as
African.
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